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COMMENTS
THE SUFFICIENCY OF TRAFFIC TICKETS
AS CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS
In the normal case against a traffic violator, the defendant is appre-
hended by an officer who has observed the alleged offense, and in due
course is given a "ticket" or summons describing the offense and fixing
the time and place for his appearance before the Municipal Court.'
There are two distinct sets of rules governing the operation and use of
motor vehicles in the State of Illinois and the City of Chicago, respective-
ly. First, there are rules prescribed by the Illinois General Assembly in the
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic 2 and second, those prescribed by the
municipality under the authority granted by Section 26 of the U.A.R.T.a
The constitutionality of ordinances promulgated under the U.A.R.T. was
upheld in Village of Winnetka v. Sinnett.4
When the arresting officer issues a "ticket" describing the offense he
will usually refer to the statute or code section number violated, along
with an abbreviated description of the offense. Later, in the processing of
such "tickets" verification is made of the original copy kept by the officer,
and the same thereupon becomes an information or complaint. Thus, a
formal charge is lodged against the person named in the "ticket."
The text of the "ticket" reads as follows:
Heretofore, to wit, on the - Day of -- 19- in the said City of Chicago,
County of Cook and State of Illinois, You --- , Address did then and
there drive and operate a certain motor vehicle, to wit, a --- , License No.
--- , State of --- Yr. -- upon a public highway of this state, to wit, ---
situated within the corporate limits of the City of Chicago aforesaid, and did
then and there unlawfully violate section --- of the (UART) or (T.R. Ordi-
nances of the City of Chicago).
Since this type of complaint purports to charge a crime, certain Federal
and State Constitutional requirements must be met. The Sixth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution imposes the following duty: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation. . . ." In Section 9 of Article II of the Illinois
Constitution a similar guarantee is stated: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to . . . demand the nature and cause of the
accusation, and to have a copy thereof...."
With these basic constitutional requirements in mind, the question for
discussion arises: Do Chicago traffic "tickets" or informations reasonably
apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him?
The operation of this constitutional guarantee was best stated in People
1 American Bar Association, The Changing State-the Unchanging Courts.
2 111. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 95!/.
3 111. Rev. Star. (1957) c. 95 Y, §98. 4272 ll. App. 143 (1933).
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v. Flynn,5 where the Illinois Supreme Court, considering an indictment
against the Mayor of Champaign, stated:
[S]ection 9 of Article II of our Constitution provides that in a criminal
prosecution the defendant shall have the right to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. This was intended to give the accused such
specific designation of the offense as well as enable him to prepare his defense
and to plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.6
For the purpose of clarity, violations under the U.A.R.T. and the
Municipal Code of Chicago will be considered separately below, with a
view to discussing the adequacy of a traffic "ticket" as an informal com-
plaint charging a crime.
VIOLATIONS UNDER THE U.A.R.T.
Generally, the charge should be so laid in the indictment or information
as to bring the case precisely within the statutory description of the
offense, distinctly alleging all material facts necessary to constitute the
essential elements of the offense. 7 Nothing is to be left to implication or
intendment,8 or to conclusion, 9 nor can the failure to aver material facts
be cured by argument or inference. 10
It appears, therefore, that a charge in the information is sufficient if it
adopts and follows the language of the statute, or is in language substan-
tially equivalent thereto. Thus, the defendant is apprised of the particular
offense charged, and the court is able to see upon what statute the charge
is founded."
It follows, then, that an information charging the statutory offense of
reckless driving must state what acts constituted the driving of a vehicle
with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons and property.
In People v. Green,1" the court held that the defendant must be given
enough information on the "ticket" to enable him to prepare his defense.
There are numerous cases which consider the sufficiency of indictments,
informations, and complaints for the violation of criminal laws; these cases
uniformly indicate the necessity for clear, certain, and unambiguous state-
ments of the nature of the offense charged. For example, alleging that the
defendant drove "without having proper regard as to the traffic and the use
5375 111. 366, 31 N.E.2d 591 (1941). 6 Ibid., at 370.
7 See People v. Powell, 353 Ill. 582, 187 N.E. 419 (1933); People v. Lake, 332 111. 617,
164 N.E. 167 (1928); People v. Sheldon, 322 111. 70, 152 N.E. 567 (1926).
8 State v. Huber, 304 Mo. 15, 263 S.W. 94 (1924).
9 Cooper v. United States, 299 Fed. 483 (C.A. 3d, 1924).
10 Hale v. United States, 89 F.2d 578 (C.C. W. Va., 1937).
11 115 A.L.R. 357 quoting from 14 R.C.L. 155-157.
12 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278 (1938).
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of the way so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any
person" without charging any willful violation was held insufficient in a
prosecution under Section 49 of the U.A.R.T. 18 An information charging
no particulars in the manner in which Section 36 of the U.A.R.T. was vio-
lated was held insufficient. 14 In the case of People v. Martin, it was said:
The use of the word "unlawfully" in connection with the allegation of
possession does not have any effect, inasmuch as the use of this word ... does
not state any fact from which the inference of unlawfulness would arise .... 15
It is difficult to ascertain what words are sufficient to charge the violator,
for while the courts have found complaints void on the grounds of insuffi-
ciency, they have not stated a standard of compliance in specific terms.
Three recent cases point up the difficulty in this area.
In People v. Neal,16 an information charging violation of the U.A.R.T.
was brought "in the name and by the authority of the People of the Chi-
cago Park District." The information was held void as it did not comply
with the constitutional requirement that all prosecutions be carried on in
the name and by the authority of the People of Illinois. 1'7
Then, in 1957, the court in People v. Lewis18 held that an information
charging that on a specified date, defendant did "unlawfully violate Section
47 of the U.A.R.T. under influence" and containing the notation, "Make of
car 54 Buick sedan" and carrying a license of a certain number and year,
did not contain essential elements charging defendant with any criminal
offense and was void and insufficient to justify conviction for driving a
vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
In 1957, the most recent case in point, People v. Perlman19 was decided.
There, an information charged the defendant with speeding in violation of
Section 49 of the U.A.R.T. The "ticket" or information read:
[Defendant] did ... operate a certain motor vehicle .. .upon a public high-
way of this state .. .situated within the corporate limits of .. .Chicago, and
did then and there unlawfully violate Section 49 . . .of the (U.A.R.T.) of
the State of Illinois by driving said vehicle at the rate of 42 [m.p.h.] within
a zone where the prima facie speed limit was 30 [m.p.h.]. 20
The court stated that such an act was not a crime at common law, but has
become such by statutory enactment and, therefore, should be so charged.
13 People v. Ribstein, 234 11. App. 440 (1924).
14 People v. Neal, 9 111. App.2d 562, 133 N.E.2d 771 (1956). See also People v. Patter-
son, 18 Ill. App. 2d 179, 151 N.E.2d 424 (1958).
15 314 Ill. 110, 115 (1924).
16 9 111. App.2d 562, 133 N.E.2d 771 (1956).
17 Ill Const. Art. VI, S 33.
18 13 Ill. App.2d 253, 141 N.E.2d 661 (1957).
19 15 Ill. App.2d 239, 145 N.E.2d 762 (1957). 20 Ibid., at 248, 767.
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In this case, the defendant was not charged in the language of the statute,
nor was the violation contemplated by the statute set out in substance. The
court went on to say:
It has been held that in order to give the court jurisdiction of the subject
matter in a criminal case it is essential that the accused be charged with a crime,
and that if he is not so charged, without any necessity of his making a motion
to quash or other objection to the pleadings and even in spite of the fact that
he has entered a plea of guilty, any judgment rendered against him under such
pleadings is void .... The information charges no offense proscribed by law. 21
It may be concluded that the standard form of complaint used in the
Chicago traffic court (that defendant did then and there violate some sec-
tion of the U.A.R.T. coupled with abbreviated words which attempt to
describe the offense) is generally insufficient to apprise the defendant of the
nature of the charge. Hence, a motion to quash would be granted.
VIOLATIONS UNDER THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO
At first glance it would seem that since a municipality is a creature of the
state, it would, in all proceedings, criminal or civil, be bound by the regu-
lations and restrictions imposed upon the state. However, in pleadings asso-
ciated with violations under municipal traffic ordinances, the courts have
taken a rather unique position. Informality of the information or complaint
seems to be the rule and not the exception.22 Generally, in prosecutions
under municipal ordinances, the form of pleading is immaterial. Regardless
of the form of pleading, if it notifies the defendant of the particular ordi-
nance which he is charged with violating, and states facts sufficient to bar
another prosecution for the same offense, the complaint is sufficient. 23
It must be remembered that the same "ticket" or information is used in
Chicago for violations under the U.A.R.T. as for violations under the
Municipal Code. Yet, for U.A.R.T. violations, strict formality in pleading
is required, while informal pleading will suffice in Municipal Code viola-
tions. The distinction, if any, perhaps lies in the nature of the prosecution.
Prosecution for Municipal Code violations have been held to be quasi-
criminal. In Chicago v. Dickson,2 4 the court recognized that ordinance vio-
lations are generally civil in cause, but held that such violations will be
enforced as being quasi-criminal in nature.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution defines the jurisdic-
tion of the Criminal Court of Cook County as including all cases criminal
and quasi-criminal in nature; in Wiggins v. Chicago, the court interpreted
this section:
21 Ibid., at 249, 767 (emphasis supplied).
2 2 City of Evanston v. Ward, 335 I11. App. 227, 81 N.E.2d 14 (1948).
23 For collection of cases see 62 C.J.S. § 327.
24 221111. App. 255 (1921).
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When the entire section is considered in the light of our jurisprudence, we
must conclude that it was intended to embrace all offenses not crimes or mis-
demeanors, but that are in the nature of crimes. . . . [A] quasi crime would
not embrace an indictable offense, whatever might be its grade, but simply
forfeitures for a wrong done to the public whether voluntary or involuntary
where a penalty is given.2 5
Violations of municipal ordinances are quasi-crimes and thus not subject
to strict interpretation of pleading formalities. If this is so, then it appears
that complaints for Municipal Code violations need only contain the num-
ber of the section violated rather than a formal statement of the charge. The
interests of time and expediency, and to prevent a "jamming up" of the
traffic courts are reasons most often advanced for disregarding pleading
formalities in cases of this nature.
CONCLUSION
There have been few cases in Illinois which have turned upon the suffi-
ciency of a traffic "ticket" as a complaint. However, several conclusions
may be drawn from the cases which have been decided on the point.
A motion to quash would be in order in nearly every prosecution under
the U.A.R.T. where the standard complaint of the Municipal Court of
Chicago is used.
Charges of reckless driving must be enumerated in detail in the words of
the statute under which prosecution is being made.
The charge of negligent driving must in detail set out the acts and the
essentials necessary to sustain a prima facie case of negligence. The
U.A.R.T. is not clear as to what constitutes negligent driving. The Illinois
Supreme Court has held that when a statute defining a crime does not de-
scribe an act or acts composing the offense, they must be specifically
averred in the information.2 6 As was said in Johnson v. People:
No principle of criminal pleading is better settled than that an indictment
for a mere statutory offense must be framed upon the statute, and that this
fact must distinctly appear upon the face of the indictment itself. That it
shall so appear, the pleader must either charge the offense in the language of
the act, or specifically set forth the facts constituting the same. It sometimes
happens, however, that the language of a statute creating a new offense does
not describe the act or acts constituting such offense. In that case the pleader
is bound to set them forth specifically.27
Regarding the sufficiency of the information for Municipal Code viola-
tions, a minimum of authority upholds the proposition that merely writing
the section number violated is sufficient.
25 68 Ill. 372, 374 (1873).
2 6 People v. Kabana, 388 Ill. 198, 57 N.E.2d 460 (1944).
27 113 1. 99, 102 (1885). See also 1 Wharton on Criminal Law §§ 164, 372 (1932).
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There appears to be no logical basis for distinguishing U.A.R.T. viola-
tions from Municipal Code violations insofar as the wording of the com-
plaint. The penalties and effects are similar in both cases. The municipality
is a mere creature of the state subject to restrictions placed upon it by the
legislature. The Municipal Code is subject to the same constitutional re-
strictions as is the U.A.R.T. Thus, there is extant, an area of law where
artificial distinctions have been imposed by judicial decision. The way is
open, then, for legislative equalization of treatment under the two bodies
of law. At the very least, supreme court clarification is called for.
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE McNABB RULE
INTRODUCTION
At early common law a confession, no matter how obtained, was admis-
sible in evidence against the person making it. In fact, a confession was
considered as the strongest evidence of guilt. In England, during the Star
Chamber proceedings, which were inquisitional in nature, many tortures
were administered to the accused to make him confess.' Modern courts,
however, have looked with a jaundiced eye on any confessions made in
such a manner. As a general rule, a confession will be admitted into evi-
dence only if it is freely and voluntarily made without any inducements
made to the accused in order to obtain the confession.2
Previous to the 1943 case of McNabb v. United States8 the courts gen-
erally held that voluntariness was the only test to be applied in determin-
ing admissibility of a confession and a delay in arraignment was only to
be considered as a factor in the voluntariness of the confession.4 In People
v. Vinci5 the Illinois Supreme Court had stated the general rule:
While an officer is frequently justified in subjecting a prisoner to a lengthy
and vigorous examination for the purpose of satisfying himself of the guilt of
the accused or for the purpose of getting information which would lead to
the discovery of crime, whether information thus elicited is a voluntary con-
fession must depend upon the facts of each case. 6
1 Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441, 267 S.W. 231 (1924).
2 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). This comment, however, does not con-
cern itself with confessions made under inducements or promises of immunity.
8 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
4 People v. Devine, 46 Cal. 45 (1873); Cahill v. People, 111 Colo. 29, 137 P.2d 673
(1943); Douberly v. State, 184 Ga. 573, 192 S.E. 223 (1937); People v. Vinci, 295 Ill.
419, 129 N.E. 193 (1920); People v. Crabb, 372 Ill. 347, 24 N.E.2d 46 (1939); Common-
wealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936); People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192,
192 N.E. 289 (1934); Cates v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 35, 37 S.W.2d 1031 (1930).
5 295 Ill 419, 129 N.E. 193 (1920).
6 Ibid., at 426, 195.
